This paper presents the results of a survey on price-setting behavior conducted on a large random sample of Swedish firms. The median firm adjusts the price once a year. State-and time-dependent price setting are about equally important. The four highest-ranked explanations for price rigidity in this study (implicit contracts, sluggish costs, explicit contracts, and the kinked demand curve) have close correspondents among the top five places in two similar large-scale surveys carried out in the UK and the U.S. The results point to the importance of the long-term relations with customers for the rigidity of prices (the estimated share of sales that go to regular customers is more than 80%).
price setting by a single firm or in a single market (for instance, cover prices of magazines in Cecchetti, 1986 ; prices in mail-order catalogs in Kashyap, 1995;  gasoline retail prices in Asplund, Eriksson, and Friberg, 2000 ; orange juice in Levy, Dutta, and Bergen, 2002) . These studies have typically found that prices are rigid and that fixed costs of adjusting prices provide a workable description of price adjustment. However, they also document a number of inconsistencies with fixed adjustment costs. A somewhat broader data set can be found in Carlton (1986) , where prices of industrial commodities were examined, producing similar findings. The small number of micro studies available makes them a rather weak foundation for macroeconomic modeling. While it is an ingenious idea to gather data by examining prices in mail-order catalogs or on magazine covers, can we be confident that results from these consumer markets extend to other markets?
Partly as a reaction to this, an alternative empirical approach was adopted in Blinder et al. (1998) (hereafter BCLR) on U.S. data (reported in part in Blinder, 1991 Blinder, , 1994 . The idea was to ask firms direct questions, expressed in laymen's terms, on how they reason and act when they set their prices.
1 An important aspect of the methodology was to put the questions to a random sample designed to be representative of GDP. A similar set of questions has since been put to a large number of UK firms by Hall, Walsh, and Yates (2000) (hereafter HWY), although the sample was non-random.
In this paper, we investigate the price-setting behavior of Swedish firms based on more than 600 questionnaire responses from a random sample designed to be representative of Swedish price-setting behavior. As discussed by BCLR, the approach adopted-to try to convey complex theories to practitioners and ask about their importance-is controversial. Responses may be sensitive to, for instance, the wording of questions, the order in which they appear, and the setting in which the questions were answered.
2 Even positive reviewers of the BCLR book, such as Ball (1999) , remain skeptical about the results regarding the more complex questions that ask firms to evaluate various propositions with regard to how they act and think when changing prices. Indeed, such caution is well founded, and the motive for BCLR to use structured surveys based on a random sample was to allow for statistical testing and replication. As they note (p. 47): "The ability to replicate research findings is the essence of scientific inquiry; it is how you distinguish a fluke from a fact." Will additional questionnaires using the same approach but with different wording, different samples, and under different circumstances produce similar results? If so, our confidence in the results should strengthen. Indeed, that seems to be the case. The picture painted by our study is in many ways very similar to that of BCLR and HWY. All three studies suggest that prices are quite rigid. In this 1. A number of older antecedents exist, typically using smaller non-random samples (see BCLR and HWY for references). One Swedish antecedent is Assarsson (1989) who interviewed 48 manufacturing companies. A parallel body of literature uses similar methods to investigate reasons for wage rigidities and other aspects of the labor market (see, for instance, Campbell and Kamlani 1997) .
2. It should be noted that research based on surveys is common in other social sciences, and there is a large body of knowledge on how to ask and interpret questions (see, for instance, Weisberg, Krosnick, and Bowen 1996) . study, the median firm adjusts the price once a year. The four explanations for price rigidity that are ranked highest by the respondents in our study (implicit contracts, sluggish costs, explicit contracts, and the kinked demand curve) are also found among the top five places in terms of importance in both the other studies. 3 While we see the present paper's perhaps main contribution as supporting the methodology and results in BCLR, there are also a number of important differences. Since the survey underlying BCLR was conducted in 1990-92, there was scope for updating the list of theories and issues into which we inquired. 4 For instance, we ask about theories on price adjustment that are based on capital market imperfections. These theories have received considerable theoretical attention, and our respondents do indeed assign them a relatively important role. Moreover, while previous studies chose not to include questions about theories that in any way implied that firms were colluding (for instance implicit collusion in repeated games à la Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) , we decided to ask about these theories, since they have received so much theoretical attention. Our list of theories is mainly based on the presentation in one of the leading graduate textbooks, that of Romer (1996) .
A few words about the macroeconomic setting are appropriate before proceeding. After going through a severe recession in the early 1990s, Sweden, at the time of the survey (spring 2000), had an essentially stable economic environment with GDP growth of 3.6%, a budget surplus of 4.1% of GDP, inflation of 1.4%, and an open unemployment rate of 4.7% (all figures are averages for 2000). Monetary policy was conducted under a floating exchange rate and with a 2% inflation target.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the survey in brief. Section 2 addresses the questions of how rigid prices are and when they change. Section 3 presents results on the different theories of price rigidity and examines the cyclical variability of markups and the reasons for changing the price. The study ends with a discussion of what we believe to be fruitful directions for future research.
SURVEY DESIGN AND SOME BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
The population from which our sample was drawn comprised all Swedish firms with more than five employees, with the exception of sectors where price setting is fully determined by political means, and sectors whose products are not priced.
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A questionnaire was sent by mail to the 1285 firms that had been sampled. The survey was conducted by Statistics Sweden (the national bureau of statistics) and accompanied by a cover letter signed by the governor of the Swedish central bank (Sveriges Riksbank), both of which may have contributed to the relatively high 3. The wording of questions differs between studies. What we call "sluggish costs" is represented by two separate statements in the previous two studies. Also, they ask about coordination failure rather than the closely related notion of the kinked demand curve.
4. HWY test the same set of theories as BCLR do. 5. Firms with fewer employees were not considered since a large number of these companies exist mainly for tax reasons and do not run any specific business. Examples of excluded companies are residents' associations, public service and defense, social services, education, and health (in contrast to practices in some other countries, these are publicly funded in Sweden). response rate of 48.7%. 6 To ensure that our sample included large firms, and to be able to compare behavior across groups, the population was stratified into eight groups according to the number of employees (four size classes) and to whether the firm was in the manufacturing or the services industry.
Given that the sample was stratified, we weighted results to calculate estimates of the population mean. To estimate the behavior of the average firm, we weighted the stratum means with the share of the stratum in the total population (in terms of the number of firms). Furthermore, the pricing decisions of very large firms are more important for the economy than those of a local supermarket. We therefore multiplied each response by the respective firm's overall pre-tax turnover from domestic sales to weight the results (see Appendix A for further details on how the survey was conducted and how the weighting was performed). We focused on turnover-weighted results when analyzing answers to the questions. These results should give a fairly accurate view of the importance of firms' price-setting policies for the Swedish price level.
Several questions asked respondents to indicate how important various considerations are when, for instance, deciding whether to adjust the price. The alternatives given were "very important," "moderately important," "of minor importance," and "totally unimportant." 7 These were converted into a numerical scale where 4 corresponds to "very important" and 1 to "totally unimportant." The mean rank presented in the paper is the weighted average of these four alternatives.
When asking about prices, we had to deal with the fact that most firms sell many types of products, at home and abroad, with and without discounts, and with different service content. We asked firms to keep in mind the actual domestic transaction price of their main product to their main type of customer when answering the questions (HWY used a similar approach, asking the respondents to focus throughout on the main product or the main product group, while BCLR asked about the most important products when investigating the frequency of price changes). The alternative of asking about several different products and types of customers is likely to have reduced the response rate considerably. Moreover, we suspected that if we instead were to ask about some "average price-setting behavior" for all the firm's products and types of customers, respondents would have found some of the questions (on the frequency of price changes, for instance) imprecise and confusing. Nevertheless, we were concerned with how well the pattern for the main product corresponded to the price-setting patterns for other products. We therefore included a final question on whether the firm considered the answers to be representative of its other products as well. A total of 90.2% either confirmed this to be the case or reported that they sell only one product. Some further issues on data quality 6. As shown in Appendix A, the response rate was lower for smaller firms as well as for serviceproducing firms. The fact that the sample mean is constructed by weighting stratum means with the shares of the stratum in the total population enables us to avoid possible selection problems due to underrepresentation of small or service-producing firms, provided that the responses are representative within each stratum. Unfortunately, we have not been able to investigate this latter assumption.
7. In connection to this, some questions asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with a given statement (regarding, for instance, reasons for not adjusting prices). The available responses were "agree totally," "agree to some extent," "agree only to a small extent," and "do not agree at all." are discussed in Appendix A. On the whole, the answers appear well thought-out, internally consistent, and correct.
Before turning to the main focus of the study-how firms set their prices-it is worth presenting the results of some background questions. Table 1 presents an overview of the distribution of sales by type of customer, the firm's relationship with its customers, and its competitive situation. The estimated average proportion of sales made to regular customers-those with which the firm expects to do business again-is 86.2%. The typical customer is another firm; the average share of sales made to other companies is 67.7%, and a further 9.6% of sales are directed at other companies within the same corporate group. The average share of sales that are directed at households is only 13.7%. This is similar to the findings of BCLR where 20.8% of sales were directed at consumers and 70.4% at businesses. The turnover-weighted estimate of the proportion of firms, which perceive that they have no competitors within their main line of business, is 4.3%, while the proportion that claims to have 12 competitors or more is 27.5%. This leaves some two-thirds of firms with 1-11 competitors, i.e., in markets that we typically think of as oligopolistic. To sum up, while standard theory focuses on an arms-length onetime sale by a manufacturer to consumers, the results here indicate that the typical transaction involves two firms that expect to do business again in an oligopolistic market. Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that an overwhelming majority of the firms report that they indeed have the ability to set prices: 90.6% of respondents answered that "the company can set the price itself" rather than "the price is set by a parent company/group or otherwise outside the company."
WHEN DO PRICES CHANGE?

How Often do Prices Change?
We asked the firms "How many times a year does the price of your main article/service change?" The estimated turnover-weighted proportion of firms in the population which adjust the price of their main product once a year was 40.3%, and an additional 27.1% adjust prices less than once a year. This is well in line with previous micro studies of price rigidities-indeed, in his summary of findings on price adjustment, Taylor (1999) notes that prices change on average once a year. Compared to the survey studies of BCLR and HWY, prices change somewhat less frequently. In BCLR, about half of the firms changed prices once a year or less, whereas the corresponding number in our study is close to 70%. In HWY, the median firm changed its price twice in the year preceding their study (conducted in September 1995) . One reason for the somewhat divergent results may be that the frequency of price changes is correlated with inflation, which was below 1.5% at the time of our study, whereas it was around 4% at the time of the studies of both BCLR and HWY. Another possible reason for the somewhat divergent results is that large firms, which tend to adjust prices more frequently, were overrepresented in the sample of HWY. 8 We experimented with regressions that examine how the number of price changes relates to market structure variables. For instance, running an ordinary least squares regression of NP (a measure of the number of price changes per year) on LARGE (dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has more than 200 employees), MANUF (dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the manufacturing sector), VARIA (dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm estimates that more than 50% of costs are variable), REGUL (the share of customers that the firm classifies as regular customers), HOUSE (the reported share of customers that are households), and HCONC (dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports having three competitors or fewer) yields (with t-statistics in parentheses): NP ϭ 4.28 (7.50) Firms tend to adjust their prices more frequently if they are large, are not operating in manufacturing, have a large share of variable costs, have relatively few regular customers, and operate in markets with more than just a couple of competitors. The share of sales to households seems virtually unrelated to the number of price changes. We examined many of the questions to see if we could relate the responses to observable structural variables such as those used in Equation (1). In general, the explanatory power of such regressions relating conduct to structure is low. This should come as no surprise; rather it is typical of cross-sectional studies on industry data (see, for instance, Bresnahan, 1989 and Schmalensee, 1989 for discussions). The reason is that markets differ along so many lines, including cost structure, the nature of strategic interaction, and the shape of demand curves, that we should not expect to find stable relations between a few variables, such as the number of competitors and the extent of price rigidity, in cross-sectional data. Some of the structural effects seen in the regression (Equation 1) seem relatively robust, however, in particular, the finding that large firms adjust more frequently (also found in BCLR and HWY) and that firms in more concentrated markets adjust less frequently (see, for instance, Carlton 1986). Explanatory power in regressions, such as the above, could be improved by adding variables that capture firm conduct or beliefs (for instance, the use of written contracts, or how highly different explanations of price rigidities are rated), but it would then become difficult to view these additional explanatory variables as exogenous. In any case, the aim of our work is to understand the prevalence of different types of behavior, and we predominantly focus on the aggregate picture that emerges.
Price Reviewing: Time-Dependent Versus State-Dependent Pricing Rules
The stability of prices indicates that there are costs associated with changing them. The two main approaches to model price adjustment when it is costly to change prices-time-and state-dependent price setting-have different implications for when prices adjust. A firm is said to follow a time-dependent rule if it changes its price at certain time intervals. These intervals may be fixed as in the original staggered contract model developed by Taylor (1980) or, in order to simplify the mathematics, stochastic as in Calvo (1983) . On the other hand, under a statedependent rule, the price is adjusted when the deviation between the current price and the optimal price has become large enough to make the profit gained from adjusting the price outweigh the cost of adjustment.
9 Thus, a fundamental difference between the two types of rules is that when events motivate a price change, a state-dependent rule predicts an immediate response, provided the shock is sufficiently large, whereas under a time-dependent rule firms will wait until the "time has come."
While models based on time-dependent pricing tend to be fairly tractable, generating well-behaved dynamic adjustment paths of the price level to innovations in nominal money, the impact in models based on state-dependent pricing is generally 9. The seminal paper is Barro (1972) . Later examples of studies that model state-dependent pricing are Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) and Caplin and Leahy (1997) . more complex and allows for a wide range of outcomes. The extreme case is the neutrality result of Caplin and Spulber (1987) , where a small number of firms making large adjustments lead to money being completely neutral.
Also under a time-dependent rule, the price will change only if this is motivated by changed economic conditions (a price change will always occur on an exogenous date, but not necessarily on all such dates). Thus, the relevant question in the survey concerns the reviewing of prices rather than actual changes, the results of which are reported in Table 2 .
The estimated turnover-weighted proportion of firms that review prices at specific intervals is 23.1%, and a further 21.7% review mainly at specific intervals. We interpret this as 44.8% of the firms following a time-dependent rule under normal conditions. If we assume that firms that review prices continuously (daily or more often) adjust their prices more or less immediately in response to special events, an estimated 47.2% follow a state-dependent rule under normal conditions. 10 Finally, note that when one includes firms that mainly review at specific time intervals as well as in response to particular events, a total of 68.9% follow a state-dependent rule if sufficiently significant events occur. This finding that firms will deviate from timedependent pricing when shocks are sufficiently large is intuitively reasonable, but has, to our knowledge, not been documented before.
TABLE 2
Frequency of Price Reviews 10. The estimated turnover-weighted proportion of firms that reviewed prices at least daily was 19% and a further 28.2% reviewed in connection with special events. Clearly, 44.8 and 47.2 do not add up to 100; the remainder of firms specified "other" in response to this question.
11. In HWY, 10% of the companies said that they performed a mixture of time-and state-dependent pricing. However, in BCLR and HWY, the questions on time-and state-dependent pricing were not structured in a way that allowed for a change of price-setting rule in the case of significant events. HWY note, however, that it is hard to believe that time-dependent price-setters "would not review or change prices in response to an event if that event was associated with a dramatic enough change in the state or the environment" (p. 432, Note 12).
Our results thus point to a more important role for state-dependent pricing than previous survey studies at first suggest; in BCLR and HWY, 60% and 79%, respectively, reported that they use time-dependent rules. One could speculate that Sweden's low-inflation environment at the time of the survey, with little need for recurrent inflation-driven nominal price adjustments, helps explain this pattern. Furthermore, BCLR (p. 90) note that for several of the firms that responded as following time-dependent rules, answers to other questions indicated that they actually follow state-dependent rules: "the fraction with meaningful periodic price reviews declines to about 40% of the total." Lastly, HWY's question was whether prices were reviewed at a specific frequency or in response to particular events. The firms that perform daily reviews (19% in our study) would then have been likely to answer "at specific intervals" and contribute to raising the proportion that follows time-dependent reviewing relative to our results.
We also examined if the decision to follow state-or time-dependent price setting could be explained by market structure, using the same explanatory variables as in Equation (1). Operating in the manufacturing sector, having a greater share of household customers, and having a greater share of regular customers are all associated with a statistically significant higher probability of using time-dependent price setting. Being in a tight oligopoly is associated with a statistically significant lower probability of using time-dependent pricing. When strategic interaction is important, it is not surprising that firms want to be prepared to change prices as soon as competitors take action. Again, the predictive power of the regressions is low (pseudo R 2 is 0.05), as is to be expected from the empirical literature on industrial organization.
Synchronization of Price Reviews
For the firms that use time-dependent price reviewing, a yearly interval is most frequent, with a turnover-weighted proportion of 65.9%, as shown in Table 2 . The second most chosen frequency is quarterly price reviews, as indicated by 15.3% of the turnover-weighted observations. Given the prevalence of yearly price reviews, their specific timing is of interest; do most firms review prices in a certain month or are price reviews evenly spread across the year? It turns out that there is a considerable bunching of price reviews over the year; 44% of firms that specified a particular month, reviewed prices in January or December. The timing of reviews may partly be driven by the fact that new government regulations and taxes often take effect on January 1. A total of 16% and 11% reviewed in October and November, respectively, with the rest of the months receiving more or less equal shares, except July, which was not specified. Thus, while there is a considerable synchronization among firms that use annual price reviewing, it should be kept in mind that the importance of synchronization is tempered by the fact that many firms use state-dependent price setting or review quarterly. Nevertheless, the reported concentration of price reviews to the turn of the year is consistent with the observed monthly changes in the consumer price index; the mean absolute change in the consumer price index in January was 1.25%, compared with 0.52% in an average month.
Synchronization within Firms
Results regarding synchronization within firms point to a bimodal distribution. The turnover-weighted proportion of firms that review one price at a time is 41.4%, while 38.3% review the prices of all their products, or most of their products, at the same time. Thus, roughly the same percentage of firms performs either a large degree of synchronization or none at all. The proportion of firms that reviewed most prices at the same time was much larger among smaller firms. This is consistent with the findings of Lach and Tsiddon (1996) , who in their study of price changes in grocery stores found high synchronization within firms.
Why was this Time Interval Chosen for Price Reviews?
We also asked firms that follow a time-dependent rule to rank various explanations for the chosen time interval. These results are shown in Table 3 .
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A two-sided t-test rejects the hypothesis that explanations have the same mean rank at the 1% level of significance. Fear of disturbing customer relations and a low frequency of shocks were clearly the most important reasons for the chosen time intervals. These findings are consistent with the ranking of different theories of price rigidities that we now turn to. 
The factors influencing the price do not 3.03 0.74 313 change often enough to motivate reviewing the price more often
It would be too costly in terms of time 1.97 1.07 295 and/or money to gather relevant information and discuss price-setting decisions more often
We do not determine the time interval 1.70 0.68 270 ourselves; it is set by the parent company/group, an authority, etc.
12. Note that the number of observations differs between questions, because the number of firms that answered "not applicable/do not know" or abstained from answering differs. In general, the questions that received lower scores also had a somewhat higher share of firms answering "not applicable/do not know" or not answering at all.
THEORIES OF PRICE RIGIDITY
The survey contained a section where the respondents were confronted with different theories of price rigidity and asked how well these theories describe the situation in their firm. Of course, conveying central aspects of theories by translating them into short non-technical statements is difficult. Nevertheless, as argued at length by BCLR, if a particular theory for rigid prices is important, we expect price setters to recognize the chain of reasoning associated with that theory.
Early criticism of (fixed) costs of nominal price adjustment as a reason for price rigidity noted that these adjustment costs often needed to be implausibly large to motivate rigid prices. The new Keynesian economics of the 1980s taught us that menu costs may be relatively small to individual price setters, but that they can accumulate to have large macro effects (see Mankiw 1985) . More generally, menu costs do not need to be large for the price to remain unchanged even in the face of relatively large monetary shocks if firms have little incentive to adjust their prices when aggregate output changes. Following the presentation in Romer (1996) , one may think of a firm that is deciding whether to change its price in the face of a fall in aggregate demand with prices of other firms held fixed. The fall in demand implies a downward shift in the profit function, which is a function of the (relative) price. Unless the profit function shifts in a perfectly parallel fashion, a new price will become optimal. The closer the new optimal price is to the old one, the smaller the incentives will be for the firm to change its price. The sensitivity of the profitmaximizing price to changes in aggregate demand is often referred to as the degree of real rigidity. The firm's incentive to adjust its price also depends upon the curvature of the profit function. If the profit function is relatively flat, moving to the new optimum makes little difference in terms of profits. A prime candidate for making the profit function relatively flat around the optimum is that costs are relatively stable.
On a general level, we were interested in whether costs of adjusting the nominal price or low incentives to adjust the price were seen as the main reason for not changing prices. We therefore asked: "Assume that you notice that there has been a slight increase in demand for your main article/service. What is normally the strongest argument for leaving the price unchanged?" The respondents were given the following alternatives: (1) it is too costly to change the price (relabeling, new price lists, etc.), (2) it is important not to diverge from the prices of competitors, and (3) it is better to leave the price unchanged as long as the costs do not change. An overwhelming majority chose one of the latter two alternatives, with more or less equal shares given to each of these explanations. In fact, the turnover-weighted estimate of the proportion that considered actual costs of changing prices to be the most important factor was 0.2%. Thus, perhaps, not very surprisingly, costs of nominal price adjustment do not in themselves appear to be a primary reason for leaving prices unchanged. Note, however, that even though menu costs are considered relatively unimportant for the price change decision, they may be non-trivial, as found in a study of supermarket pricing by Dutta et al. (1997) . 13 We now turn to a detailed discussion of the different theories. Respondents were asked to rank the importance of each of the statements designed to summarize the different theories for why prices might be sluggish. The average, turnoverweighted results are shown in Table 4 . The dashed lines indicate that a two-sided t-test rejects the hypothesis that the explanations immediately above and below the line have the same mean rank at the 5% level of significance. In Table 4 , we also made an attempt to classify the different theories as reflecting either costs of adjusting the nominal price (nominal rigidity) or low incentives to adjust the relative price (here referred to simply as real rigidity).
According to the theory of implicit contracts, transaction costs induce firms and customers to enter into implicit agreements that stabilize prices when demand fluctuates. This idea is closely related to work by Okun (1981) on what he called "the invisible handshake," which, in turn was based on work aimed at explaining wage rigidity.
14 Even though Okun appears to have intended the implicit contract theory to apply to nominal rather than real prices, this is by no means obvious.
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Typically, customers are assumed to care about real, or relative, prices, and not nominal ones. However, in our survey, we asked if a price change would risk damaging customer relations, even if competing companies were also to change their price. This addition was made primarily as a way of separating this motive for price stickiness from the theory of the kinked demand curve, where a price increase results in a substantial loss of sales due to a higher relative price. Thus, firms appear to believe that customers appreciate a stable nominal price and that they may be dissatisfied even if the price relative to that of competitors remains unchanged. One reason why this version of implicit contracts may not still be accurately regarded as a nominal stickiness is that even if the price relative to the closest competing firms does not change, the price relative to other products and services may do so. Table 4 therefore shows the theory in both columns. It is not surprising that a fear of upsetting customer relationships is an important consideration when setting prices, given the large share that are regular customers. The mean turnoverweighted score given to the implicit contract theory is 3.06 for firms with at least 90% sales to regular customers, whereas the mean score is 1.94 for firms with less than 10% of their sales to regular customers.
The theory that we have chosen to call sluggish costs is represented by the statement "the costs of the firm's inputs do not vary much over the business 13. We also asked questions aimed at uncovering the nature of adjustment costs-whether firms mainly see them as fixed, increasing in the size of the price change (as in Rotemberg 1982) , or a combination of the two (as in Slade 1998) . Fixed adjustment costs were seen as the most important (90.5% of those who answered), but the question appears to have been conceptually difficult, and a full 43.7% answered "do not know/not relevant." Similarly, a question on whether fixed costs varied over time (as in Caballero and Engel 1993) appears to have been difficult (15.3% answered "do not know/ not relevant"). Forty-nine percent answered that adjustment costs were stable over time and a further 30.7% that they varied, but too little to influence the pricing decision.
14. See for instance Azariadis (1975) . 15. See BCLR (p. 150).
TABLE 4
The Importance of Different Theories of Price Stickiness (Turnover-Weighted Rank)
Question: There are a number of theories as to why companies sometimes choose not to change the price or only to change the price slightly. Here are a number of theories presented in brief. How important are these theories when it comes to explaining potential price inertia and price adaptation in yourcompany during economic booms andeconomic recessions? Theory 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sluggish costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Explicit contracts
The price is regulated in 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Liquidity constraints
In a recession, when demand As it is unclear whether implicit contracts in the form implied by the question in the survey are best characterized as a nominal or real rigidity, the rank is displayed in both columns.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b
The wording used to describe "sluggish costs" approximately corresponds to two separate statements in both BCLR and HWY: "price increases are delayed until costs have risen" (called cost-based pricing) and "variable costs are roughly constant as production rises" (called constant marginal costs).
c BCLR and HWY essentially use the wording "firms tend to hold back price changes, waiting for other firms to go first" when describing the theory called coordination failure. We assume that this hypothesis is approximately manifested by the flat upper part of the kinked demand curve where "the firms will lose a lot of customers when raising the price." d BCLR use a definition "costly price adjustment," which covers both of the hypotheses "decision-making costs" and "physical menu costs."
cycle, which implies that the price of the firm's output does not change much either." Thus, it embraces two hypotheses: that the cost of inputs is an important determinant of the firm's price-setting decision, and that these costs do not fluctuate much with changes in aggregate demand. In one way, this does not explain price stickiness; it basically argues that some prices are stable because other prices-those of inputsare also stable. Nevertheless, it suggests that input-output linkages among firms along a multi-stage production process may play an important role in explaining aggregate price rigidity.
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The third-highest score is given to renegotiation costs of explicit contracts, which clearly can be regarded as a nominal rigidity. Of course, explicit contracts explain nominal price stickiness in a trivial way and beg the question why such contracts are used in the first place. In a number of background questions, we further investigated the use of explicit contracts. We asked: "Approximately how large a part of the sales of your main article/service are through contracts signed in advance, which specify for example a particular quantity and/or particular sales price for a specific period of time?" The use of written contracts appears widespread, with the estimated turnover-weighted proportion of firms that have at least three-quarters of their sales specified through written contracts being 48.2%. Of the firms that do use written contracts, 65.5% use contracts that specify both price and quantity, while a further 32.1% use contracts that only specify price. Most firms respond that their typical contract is valid for a maximum of one year-the turnover-weighted proportion that is valid for half a year or less is 36.2%, and a further 46.0% are valid for 7-12 months. Only some 2% of firms responded that a contract covered two years or more. Also, note that even though the common use of contracts appears to be an important source of price rigidity, it need not imply that prices remain unchanged during the contract period; 29.5% of firms (turnover-weighted proportion) responded that the price specified in a contract was typically indexed to inflation or to some cost index. Finally, it should be stressed that a significant proportion of firms makes little use of written contracts-18.7% do not sell through written contracts at all, and a further 16.8% made only 1%-25% of their sales through written contracts.
Among the theories that more explicitly involve interactions between competitors, the kinked demand curve received the highest score. The argument here is that the firm assumes the worst when considering which price to set. If it raises its price, it expects that other firms will not follow suit and hence it will lose market shares. If, on the other hand, it cuts its price, it assumes that competitors will promptly do the same. Thus, even substantial changes in marginal costs may not induce a change in price. A suggested explanation for the kinked demand curve is imperfect information among customers that makes existing customers more sensitive to price increases than the prospective new customers are to price decreases (see, for example, Stiglitz, 1979 , Woglom, 1982 .
The fifth-highest rank is given to countercyclical cost of finance. The idea here is that capital market imperfections make the cost of finance higher in recessions, when firms' cash flow and credit worthiness are lower (see, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997) . This contributes to upholding marginal costs, and thereby prices, in a downturn. The relatively high score given to this may partly be explained by the credit crunch that Sweden experienced in the early 1990s, which is still likely to be fresh in memory.
A closely related reason for the firm to keep prices high when demand is low may be liquidity constraints. This theory combines the assumption that a firm's stock of customers responds only gradually to price changes with the assumption that capital market imperfections create liquidity constraints. A reduced cash flow during a recession may cause a firm to keep its price up, sacrificing future customer stock because liquidity constraints make today's revenue extra-valuable (see, for instance, Gottfries, 1991, Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996) .
Pricing thresholds is a theory based on consumer psychology. Retailers often price at SEK 49.95, for example, instead of SEK 50. Apparently, they assume that their product will sell considerably better at a price marginally lower than some specific, presumably psychologically significant, figure. Hence, they may be reluctant to change the price, even when faced with an increase in demand. While hard to reconcile with the standard versions of rational consumer behavior, the explanation, nevertheless, appears to carry some weight as an explanation of price rigidities.
The theory we have called shifting customer clientele suggests that the elasticity of demand is procyclical because the composition of customers differs over the business cycle (see, for example, Bils 1989) . The assertion in our questionnaire is based on a model in which firms have both loyal customers with low price elasticities and occasional customers with higher price elasticities. The loyal customers tend to stay put even during a cyclical contraction, which implies that the price is kept relatively high.
The theory called deviation from implicit collusion suggests that it is more tempting to defect from a collusive agreement when demand is relatively high. As a consequence, markups have to be kept lower in booms to provide sufficient incentives for implicit collusion (see, for instance, Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986 , Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991 , 1992 . Of course, it may be problematic to ask firms straightforward questions related to collusion, even though implicit collusion in itself is not illegal. 17 In the questionnaire, we therefore used the wording "Price wars are more common when demand in the economy is high, which contributes to keeping the price down during a boom," which we believed to be fairly uncontroversial.
Price stickiness may also emanate from so-called thick-market effects, both on the demand side and the supply side. On the demand side, the idea is that consumers tend to increase their search activity when they shop more intensively, i.e., during periods of high economic activity (see Warner and Barsky 1995) . One reason for this may be that there are economies of scope involved in such a search. As a result, the 17. This was also the reason why BCLR and HWY did not ask about this theory. elasticity of demand is greater in peak periods, which tends to keep prices down. On the supply side, it is assumed that when economic activity is high, it is easier for the firm to sell its products and to find suitable subcontractors. This tends to suppress costs, and hence prices, during booms.
18
Low scores are given to two menu-cost theories of the more traditional type. Physical menu costs, such as printing new price lists and notifying retailers, received a mean score between "totally unimportant" and "of minor importance." An oftensuggested alternative, information-gathering costs (see, for example, Ball and Mankiw 1994) scored even lower.
Throughout, there is a high correlation between our findings and the results obtained by BCLR and HWY for the U.S. and the UK, respectively. The last two columns of Table 4 show the ranking of theories in these two studies. The precise wording aimed at representing the different theories differs somewhat, as does the set of theories tested.
19 Interestingly, however, the four highest-ranked theories in our study are also found within the top five places in the other studies, given our interpretation of how the presentation of the theories in BCLR and HWY relates to that in our study (notes to Table 4 explain the differences). Implicit and explicit contracts, sluggish costs, and the kinked demand curve are the explanations for rigid prices that firms judge to be the most important.
Thus, the studies paint a very similar picture. The risk of disturbing customer relations by changing the price is a central cause of price rigidity. In addition, interaction with competitors matters insofar as a single firm appears to be reluctant to raise its price ahead of other firms. Explicit contracts that fix the price for a certain period are an important reason for nominal price stickiness. In addition to these demand-related reasons, limited variability of costs is a key explanation of stable prices over the business cycle. While even this short list may appear to indicate that everything but the kitchen sink is important, we shall argue in our concluding discussion that there may be a rather precise lesson to be learned from the answers.
On the Cyclicality of Markups
The above test of theories draws on two related bodies of literature. One looks at the reasons why costs of adjusting nominal prices imply either a gradual adjustment of the price to a new equilibrium following a shock, or no adjustment at all. These theories not only encompass the whole nominal rigidities camp but also include the kinked demand curve. The other set of theories focuses explicitly on how the profit-maximizing markup develops over the business cycle. For instance, even if there were no costs associated with adjusting prices, the optimal markup 18. The classic reference is Diamond (1982) . 19. HWY note that some of the suggested explanations in both BCLR's study and their own actually are symptoms rather than causes of price stickiness; for example, the hypothesis that firms in the short run adjust stocks rather than prices. In the set of theories used in this study, we included, in particular, a number of potential sources of real rigidity from Romer (1996) . We also excluded some of the theories that scored the lowest in BCLR's study, e.g., "judging quality by price." might be lower in a boom. The markups would then be countercyclical. The issue of whether markups are countercyclical or procyclical (lower or higher in booms) is important since procyclical markups would tend to dampen fluctuations in economic activity, whereas countercyclical markups would amplify fluctuations. While many of the models explicitly predict countercyclical markups, for instance the relatively highly ranked countercyclical cost of finance, the test of the theories above does not give us any conclusive evidence on the cyclical behavior of markups. For instance, countercyclical costs of finance may exert important upward pressure on prices in a recession, but this may be more than outweighed by other factors.
In anticipation of this, the respondents were asked to rank how well a number of statements described the development of markups over the business cycle. Let us first note that marginal cost is difficult to estimate, except for very simple production technologies, and that firms' pricing decisions often tend to be based on average variable costs. 20 For this reason, we are unwilling to draw any strong conclusions about how markups over marginal costs develop over the business cycle based on the answers to this question. An increase in marginal costs is clearly associated with an increase in average variable costs, but the relationship between marginal and average variable costs is not necessarily one-to-one. For instance, if we increase quantity so that we move from a relatively flat section of the marginal cost curve to a steeply upward-sloping section, marginal costs will rise sharply whereas average variable costs will only gradually reflect the higher marginal costs.
As reported in Table 5 , the most common practice seems to be the use of a constant markup, changing the price proportionally when costs change. Next come procyclical markups while, interestingly, countercyclical markups are given the lowest mean rank, halfway between "agree only to a little extent" and "do not agree at all." A two-sided t-test rejects the hypothesis that the alternatives have equal rank at the 5% level of significance. The results are consistent with a sizeable literature that finds that markups on average variable costs are procyclical or independent of the business cycle (see, for instance, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1986 , Machin and Van Reenen, 1993 , Ghosal, 2000 . The results may also be consistent with countercyclical markups on marginal costs if many respondents, as one might suspect, had average variable costs in mind when answering the question. Following the logic above, marginal costs will vary at least as much as average variable costs over the business cycle; so if markups on average variable costs are constant, markups on marginal costs will be countercyclical. Despite this, the low rank of countercyclical markups surprised us; Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) interpreted the evidence in their survey as generally supporting countercyclical markups (on marginal costs).
A more definite resolution of whether markups on marginal costs are pro-or countercyclical is likely to emerge only through a considerable number of studies 20. BCLR had some doubts about the responses on marginal costs, with only slightly more than 10% of firms saying that marginal costs were increasing in quantity. One could hypothesize that the problems associated with the concept are not so much due to business people not understanding the concept of marginal costs (after all, any MBA has had at least some exposure to economics). Rather, we expect them, just as empirical economists, to have difficulty estimating the marginal cost for all but the simplest techniques. 
When demand increases, variable 2.52 0.85 466 costs rise less than the price the company can charge for the article/ service, i.e., the markup increases
The markup varies over time, 2.38 0.80 465 unsystematically in but not in any systematic relation to demand way in relation to demand
1.55 0.71 466 costs increase more than the price the company can charge for the article/service, i.e., the markup declines of industries with a very simple cost structure, so that one can be reasonably sure that good data on marginal costs exist, or by using structural models to estimate markups without using cost data (see, for instance, Genesove and Mullin, 1998 for an application and evaluation of this method).
Why do Prices Change?
We also asked firms to rank the importance of different motives for actually changing their price. While not necessarily linked to price rigidity, we felt that this was an important aspect for understanding the decision to adjust prices. These results are shown in Table 6 . As before, a dashed line separates the cases where a two-sided t-test rejects the hypothesis that explanations have the same mean rank at the 5% level of significance. The pattern that emerges is well in line with standard economic theory. Changes that affect demand or marginal costs receive the highest scores. It is also notable that changes in the consumer price index per se have little importance. To the extent that the consumer price index matters, it does so predominantly through cost and demand channels. The highest score is given to price changes by competitors. As indicated by the background characteristics reported in Section 1, the typical firm operates in an oligopolistic market. We should hence not be surprised that interaction with competitors is important for the decision to adjust prices. 21. As in several other cases, we ran regressions to see if results could be related to structural variables. Indeed, firms that reported having more competitors were more likely to reply that price changes by competitors are "very important" for the decision to change prices. As in other regressions relating to structure, explanatory power was low. 
DISCUSSION
The results of our random sample indicate that the typical sale is made to another business that is also a regular customer. It is likely that there is at least some form of relation-specific investment on the buyer's side-for instance, choosing a new supplier would mean retraining staff and adjusting machinery and work patterns. Having made such a relation-specific investment, the buyer is vulnerable to ex post opportunism by the seller unless the parties contract on all contingencies ex ante. This is known as the holdup problem and has been extensively studied within contract theory. 22 A partial solution to the holdup problem is written contractsyou commit to sell to us at a specific price. Such contracts are incomplete, however, and trust and reputation take on important roles. Based on the survey evidence, it seems like the logic underlying incomplete contracting has the potential to go a long way towards explaining price rigidity. All the highest-ranked theories of price rigidity correspond well with such a view. The theories of implicit contracts and kinked demand curve are both consistent with the notion of a stock of customers, a group that have made some relation-specific investment. Explicit contracts are clearly also compatible with this notion, and if a firm's input side looks anything like its output side, such contracts imply that costs will be relatively stable. An important role for incomplete contracts in explaining price rigidity is also consistent with the very detailed case study of pricing by a single firm conducted by Zbaracki et al. (2000) .
Consequently, there appears to be much to be said for basing models of rigid prices on a contract theory approach. Incorporating incomplete contracting problems 22 . See Battigalli and Maggi (2002) for a recent analysis. A related literature examines switching costs in consumer markets (see Klemperer 1995) . more explicitly into general equilibrium models might be too much to ask. We believe, however, that an understanding of these underpinnings would be rewarding in that it might enable us to conclude that time-dependent price-setting rules or convex adjustment costs can be convenient modeling tricks, but that the search for microfoundations of rigid prices might fruitfully shift towards issues such as verifiability (Are you trying to take advantage of me by raising the price or have your costs really gone up so that you need to share the burden?), constraints on pricing set by outside options, and renegotiation of nominal contracts. In a holdup framework, a price hike that is not clearly linked to an increase in costs may signal that the seller is trying to take advantage of the lock-in produced by the buyer's relation-specific investment, whereas a lowering of prices might attract few new customers in the short run since they are locked in with their current suppliers.
Questionnaires have similarly suggested that incomplete contracts may be an important explanation for why wages are rigid (see, for instance, Campbell and Kamlani 1997 ). This has been followed up fruitfully in theoretical work by Macleod and Malcomson (1993) and in experimental work by Fehr and Falk (1999) . We believe that similar approaches may also hold much in store for price rigidities.
APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND DATA QUALITY
The survey was conducted by Statistics Sweden during March-May 2000. The questionnaire was put together by the authors, with Statistics Sweden providing input on the design of questions. Data collection and sample design were handled by Statistics Sweden. The sample was stratified according to the number of employees and according to the manufacturing/services industry (see Table A1 ). The total number of firms sampled was 1300, and the questionnaire was sent to 1285 firms (15 of the sampled firms either had no sales, had merged, or had ceased to exist).
The questionnaire was sent out to firms on March 14, 2000, and was accompanied by a cover letter signed by the governor of Sveriges Riksbank. A follow-up letter was sent after two weeks and an additional follow-up letter three weeks thereafter. 
where h ϭ 1,2,…,8 represents strata, N h is the population size in stratum h, N is the total number of firms in the population, n h is the number of responses in stratum h, and y i is the response given by firm i. As discussed, we also wanted to weight the answers with a measure of the firms' importance for the development of the price level. We used turnover from domestic sales (based on the reporting of value-added tax) as a weight, and thus estimated Y′ ϭ Y* domestic turn over. As we did not have the total turnover from domestic sales for the population, this also had to be estimated, yielding the following expression for the estimated population mean:
N h n h * domestic turnover i .
A.2 Proportions
We were also interested in describing the proportion of firms that specified a particular alternative, such as 50% of firms adjusted their price once a year. Here, as well, we needed to adjust for the differential sampling fractions across strata, so the estimated proportion in the whole population that specified alternative k becomes
where a hi takes the value 1 if the firm has specified option k and 0 otherwise. We also estimated the proportion weighted by domestic turnover, specified as 
A.3 The Quality of Responses
Let us briefly address the quality of responses. One issue relates to whether respondents misinterpreted questions and whether cognitive factors such as the sequencing of questions led respondents to particular answers. One way to check the quality of the answers is to see if responses to different questions are mutually consistent, and to see if the story that they tell makes sense. Some cases were puzzling. For instance, 27 firms answered that they had no competitors in their main line of business, but four of these firms nevertheless claimed that price changes by competitors had been a very important reason for changing prices in recent years. While there may have been competitors that had recently gone out of business, thus making these answers consistent, it is possible that respondents may have had their own firm in mind when answering one question and their corporate group in mind when answering another.
Nevertheless, for the most part we found that answers were indeed consistent. For example, 200 firms claimed in question 4 that they review prices annually, while in question 10, 192 of these firms stated that they change prices on average once a year or less.
23 Also, as we argued above, the picture that emerges is consistent with what has been found in previous studies using a different wording for questions, a somewhat different set of theories, different sequencing, and different methods for collecting data (BCLR used personal interviews).
As discussed, we inquired about the price setting of the most important product. How is this likely to influence the conclusions about the stickiness of prices and the nature of price adjustment that one can infer from our study? On a quantitative level, the average price level of many firms is likely to be less sticky than the prices of their individual products since not all prices are reviewed at the same time. What about the qualitative nature of price adjustment? As discussed in Section 1, 90.2% of firms claimed that the answers given were also representative of their other products. This indicates that the results are not likely to be seriously misleading with respect to the pattern of price adjustment.
Theory, and therefore many of the questions, is focused on relatively simple standardized products with fixed prices. In contrast, many firms see their products as tailor-made to some degree (think, for instance, of optometric services where the components are priced according to a price list and the price of the glasses will depend on customer choices). To help such firms, we gave instructions at the beginning of the questionnaire that firms with "tailor-made" products should focus on the price of inputs (typically the charge per hour). Firms, which in a background question described their product as non-standardized, did not appear to have found the questions in the rest of the survey problematic; they answered the rest of the questions in much the same way as other firms, and had about the same response rate. One can of course speculate that these firms may have adjusted their answers in order to make them fit in better in our "economist" framework. An indication that this is not the case (besides the fact that we tried to give clear instructions) is that firms indeed appear to have made use of the option "not applicable/do not know" in cases where they found our questions confusing or a poor reflection of their views of reality. For instance, as mentioned in Note 13, almost half of respondents chose "not applicable/do not know" to the rather abstract question on the functional form of adjustment costs.
Yet another concern regards the care that respondents exercised when answering. Did they simply jot down some figures or did they actually possess the relevant knowledge and make an effort to answer correctly? One way to examine this is to use the figures on both turnover from domestic sales and total turnover that were included in the data from Statistics Sweden. We asked respondents the following closely related question: "Approximately how large a percentage of the sales of your main article/service is in Sweden and how large a percentage abroad?" While there were a number of outliers, the answers to our question closely matched the turnover data from Statistics Sweden (based on the tax accounting of valueadded tax). The mean difference between the reported export share in the survey and the export share in the turnover data was 2.5%. At the 10th percentile, the difference between the two figures was Ϫ6.3%, while at the 90th percentile the difference was 16.8%. We take this as a comforting indication that the average respondent not only knows his/her company well, but also exercised care in completing the questionnaire.
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